Nothing to do with luck

If that mushy "human interest" stuff which fills the newspapers between the news pages and those on the City or sports is what you like to read, then Brenda Maddox's book, Maggie, is made for you. But if you like a biography to value accuracy and facts over error-laden slush and prejudice, then give this one a miss.

Maddox's account of the Falklands War is a travesty of truth. She writes that the Canberra was hit by an Exocet missile which failed to explode. Exocets, alas, did explode, but fortunately none touched the Canberra. Nor is this an isolated, unimportant error.

The sinking of the Argentine battleship General Belgrano was not ordered to scupper a promising Peruvian peace plan. The War Cabinet was unaware of the Peruvian plan when the order was given, and since the plan did not provide for unconditional Argentinian withdrawal, it stood no chance of acceptance.

Her sneer that Thatcher's friend Reagan deserted her is pure nonsense. Not only did America supply weapons and fuel, but the President made available vital information gathered by military spy satellites.

Maddox claims that, "All during her Prime Ministership, Margaret Thatcher had been lucky." Luck, she says, accounted not only for her Falklands victory but for the defeat of Scargill's coal strike, too. It did not feel like that to those of us who were involved in either battle. Luck always plays a part in human affairs, but when his winning shot was described as "lucky" the old master golfer Arnold Palmer said: "Yes, and the more I practise, the luckier I get."

Anyone who says Margaret Thatcher's career was more about luck than remorseless preparation, hard work and will, badly misunderstands that lady.

The copy of this book which I read had not been finally edited, so some of the numerous errors may have been weeded out before publication. But they should never have been made in the first place. It is no secret that Cecil Parkinson resigned over the Sara Keays affair when he was Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, not chairman of the Conservative Party. Nor that I left the Government in 1987, and was not in the Cabinet when Thatcher fell in 1990. Nor that the Westland helicopter factory is at Yeovil, not Bristol.

I was not party chairman at the time of the quarrel between Thatcher and Nigel Lawson. I did not "walk out" of a television programme with Bishop Shepherd, nor was I ambitious to succeed Thatcher as Prime Minister. I had by then ended my ministerial career to care for my wife. I can only assume that if I found so many errors of fact about events involving me, there is a fair chance that there are plenty more involving others.

It is particularly regrettable that Maddox recycles an old myth about the leadership challenge which brought Thatcher down. When she was told that she had won a majority over Heseltine on the first ballot, but not a sufficient one, it was not "instinct" which caused her to announce she would "fight on". That was exactly what she had agreed in advance with her campaign team.

Unfortunately, Maddox trusts the views of those with the biggest grudges against Margaret Thatcher, particularly Chris Patten. Patten's incompetent handling of the poll tax - which he declared to be an election-winner - badly damaged the government. His patronising disparagement of Thatcher, which permeates this book, flows from his envy of her intellectual superiority and abiding resentment at having to take orders from a woman.