Toppling Saddam would bring a greater threat

Saddam Hussein, who celebrated his 65th birthday in April, is unlikely to celebrate another one. The US President has made clear his intention to overthrow him regardless of the consequences. Saddam is accused of having unconventional weapons which represent a danger to the Middle East and the rest of the world. Yesterday Hans Blix, the chief UN weapons inspector, warned the Americans about their belligerent approach, but that's unlikely to diminish Bush's desire for "regime change".

Recent developments distinguish the present situation from the 1991 Gulf War. The George W Bush administration is dismissive of the rejection of its plans to remove Saddam by Arab and other governments. In addition, Saddam's security apparatus, one of the most tightly organised and effective in the world, has been successful in neutralising the feckless, divided and corrupt US-sponsored opponents of his regime.

The Gulf War was a response to Saddam's occupation of Kuwait. The 34-country coalition led by America liberated the oilrich sheikdom in a matter of days. Saddam owes the fact that he is still in power to the coalition's failure to expand its mandate to include removing him from office.

This time, Saddam himself is the target. But getting rid of him will not be easy. He commands an army of 600,000 and, ironically, what might follow Saddam is likely to be worse than the world's leading criminal.

Iraq is made up of Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen ethnically and Shias and Sunnis religiously. Without Saddam or a strong government to hold it together, it could fragment into three countries. The Kurds have always wanted a country of their own in northern Iraq. The Shias, 60 per cent of Iraq's population, are likely to want a country of their own in southern Iraq. The middle of the country would go to the Sunnis.

The second possibility of what might follow Saddam is a new dictatorship run by an unknown army officer. This would mean Saddamism without Saddam - a vicious regime that would use force to keep the country united. The third prospect is a takeover of all of Iraq by Shia Islamic fundamentalists. This could lead to a civil war and pose a greater threat than Saddam to Iraq's neighbours. The Shias in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia would want to follow suit.

The chances of establishing a democracy in Iraq are no more than wishful thinking. Advocates of a democratic regime are unknown to the Iraqi people, and even before Saddam the country was never democratic. Furthermore, a democratic regime might prove infectious and endanger the pro-West governments of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region.

Saddam's neighbours feel secure while he is in power. The Butcher of Baghdad is less of a threat to them than a new invigorated regime or a Muslim fundamentalist one. Inside Iraq, the people of the country are more concerned with the availability of food and medicine than in a change of government. They have not been offered any incentives to rise against the tyrant. On the contrary, they remember the experience of 1991 when they responded to appeals to act against Saddam only to be abandoned by America, which feared what might follow him.

The US option of invading Iraq and removing Saddam has to be seen as a desperate measure. It confirms that overthrowing from within the country or through his US-sponsored opponents has not worked and is unlikely to succeed. It also proves that the Bush administration has been unable to produce an intelligent alternative to the costly business of attacking Iraq and occupying it.

Fortunately or unfortunately, the Arab governments are not strong enough to support America's plan. Saddam is popular - the Arab people see him as the one leader who has stood up to the West. They are totally opposed to an invasion of Iraq and would rise against their own governments if they supported America. They are unconcerned with the brutality of Saddam's regime because they have not lived under it and suffered its oppression.

When the test comes, as observers believe it must, the whole Middle East will be destabilised. A confrontation between the Arab people and their leaders would be inevitable. The Islamic fundamentalists would spearhead street riots in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the pro-West regimes. The resulting chaos would be hard to contain.

What the future holds for Iraq and the rest of the Middle East is impossible to predict. What does the Bush administration intend to do once Saddam is removed? What will be the reaction of the Iraqi people? What will be the outcome of a confrontation between the Arab people and their leaders?

Recently I spoke to more than a dozen members of the Iraqi opposition. None of them was enthusiastic about the prospects of an American invasion of Iraq. As one of them said: "It could unbalance the Middle East more than the Palestinian problem." This is a prospect that should be taken seriously by America and its British ally. But this is unlikely. The events of 11 September have damaged America's ability to think clearly.

The only certainty in the present situation is that Saddam will behave in character. This means that if pushed hard he will resort to using chemical and biological weapons. In other words, the result of an American invasion of Iraq is likely to be exactly what America is trying to avoid. It would give Saddam what he always wanted, a place in Arab history. America's emotional response to what happened a year ago is understandable, but shallow and dangerous. The march of folly is upon us and there is no light at the end of the tunnel.

Said Aburish is author of 'Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge'.