The real struggle starts after 'victory'

Privileged observers of the US Administration in Washington paint a bleak picture of its current predicament. Senior figures are deeply uncertain how to prosecute the next phase of the struggle in Afghanistan. President Bush and Vice-President Cheney watch passively as their advisers wrangle over the familiar issues day after day: continue bombing or halt for Ramadan? Strike at Iraq? Prepare a major ground offensive for the spring?

It would be idle to pretend that Britain is anywhere near the centre of this decision-making loop, or is even privy to much of the debate. There is no close relationship between General Myers, Chairman of the American Joint Chiefs, and his British counterpart Admiral Sir Michael Boyce. The US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld does not feel much rapport with the British office-holder, Geoff Hoon.

The Americans are grateful that Britain is being so supportive. But sentiment does not win Britain a place at top decision-making level in Washington. It never has done, even back in 1950 when a vastly larger British force was fighting alongside Americans in the Korean War. The most effective working links between Britain and America were then, and remain today, those between the two nations' intelligence communities.

But is any of this surprising? Should we construe it as a signal that the struggle against terrorism is going badly, or merely as showing that it is bound to be a long and difficult business for the world to work out how to conduct a wholly new kind of campaign?

As far back as 12 September, shrewd commentators noted that America's overwhelming military power was irrelevant to the sort of battle the West would now have to wage against terrorism. President Bush's hasty dispatch to sea of large naval and air forces was largely symbolic. Yet it was also plain that some military gesture from the United States was inevitable, to reflect the nation's anger and determination to fight back.

Professor Sir Michael Howard, always a brilliant analyst of these matters, said at once that the chief objective of any military action must be to ensure that it did as little harm as possible to the long-term conduct of a sensible, patient, largely invisible campaign against terrorism. I reported repeatedly that all the soldiers I respect regarded bombing operations against Afghanistan as a firepower demonstration rather than an effective tool in our new predicament. That did not invalidate the air attack. It merely caused us to hope that the leaders of the coalition had a clear idea what practical measures they would adopt, once the demonstration was over.

In reality, we find that they have still not made up their minds. They are continuing to bomb in the hope that the Taliban will crack, and to buy more time for their own agonising. Unfortunately, in the eyes of many people in the West, it seems almost frivolous to unleash B-52s against this background. It is essential for the leadership of a power which is using weapons of war to show grip and purpose as it does so. To be seen to falter at the top is to invite public support to falter also.

The great concern now is that Sir Michael Howard's fears will be fulfilled: the short-term military operation will damage the long-term political and diplomatic and intelligence campaign against terrorism. Bombs are never good for "hearts and minds". They become progressively less helpful, the longer they go on falling.

Dr Henry Kissinger, in his impressive CPS lecture in London on Wednesday night, revealed himself among those who fear that an exaggerated focus on Afghanistan will damage the West's ability to address terrorism in other places - Iraq foremost among them.

The best analysts of this crisis believe that politics and hard cash will yield the big rewards against terrorism, rather than large-scale military action. Money - a vast amount of it - can be used to woo and assist non-aligned Muslim states, above all Pakistan. The Washington Administration needs to learn a great deal very quickly about the complexities and rivalries of the Islamic world, instead of perceiving it as a monolith. It must stop thinking of Afghanistan as a country, a nation state, and address it as an anarchic society of mutually hostile tribes, which is scarcely governed at all in any sense we understand.

Above all, of course, Washington must maintain its determination to seek justice for the Palestinians, whatever that may prove to mean. Only the United States can force Israel to disgorge the Occupied Territories. If the US's will to do this flags, then we must accept the absolute inevitability that violent confrontation between Islam and the West will continue indefinitely. On the other hand, achieving a Palestinian settlement will take years. Any attempt to rush the timescale to meet short-term political, media and public pressures is doomed.

And amid all this, the bombing of Afghanistan goes on. The unanimous opinion of the best soldiers and analysts is that, having started this thing, we must now see it through. The argument is about what this should mean.

A strategist who has always been deeply sceptical about the Afghan campaign said to me this week: "I feel like Haig on the Somme when I say that we have to go on. But there really is no choice, because to stop until we can declare a 'victory' would represent an intolerable humiliation for the West."

Everything possible must be done to dissuade the United States from a big military operation in Afghanistan next spring. What is needed, as quickly as possible, is an outcome in Kabul which allows the coalition to declare victory, end the military phase, and allow a big humanitarian programme to start.

The difficulties of finding Osama bin Laden seem as great as ever, but his capture or death become more urgently desirable with every week that passes. We still have no idea how close the Taliban might be to crumbling. It seems increasingly likely that the West will decide to be content with toppling the Kabul regime, as a pretext for ending air attacks. After that, Washington could wait - perhaps for a very long time - until intelligence locates Bin Laden, before committing special forces to deal with him.

It is wrong to suggest that only an impatient media is demanding a speedy outcome of the Afghan military campaign. In reality - and as some of us have said from the outset - it is vital for the West to end the "war" in Afghanistan before it does irremediable damage to our longer term interests.

Only when the coalition has achieved something it can call military success, can the real intelligence and diplomatic struggle against terrorism begin.