Sharon's big plan heads deeper into the morass

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The war in Palestine is Ariel Sharon's war. Yasser Arafat and the suicide bombers furnished every conceivable provocation and justification. But the die was cast by the Israeli Prime Minister last Thursday night.

The decision was neither impetuous nor a blind lashingout in fury. An angry spot glows on Sharon's brow, as on Caesar's. But this war is not a grudge match with Arafat. As he announced when he came to power in February last year, though few then believed him, Sharon is a man with a plan

On at least two occasions he might have chosen a different course: last December, when Arafat dowsed Palestinian terrorism for a time - only for Israel to respond with targeted assassinations; and last week, when the bloodbath in Netanya saved Israel from any need to address the Saudi peace initiative. Instead, Sharon elected a military course.

His war aims are much broader than the declared objective of "destruction of the terrorist infrastructure". As in 1982, when he unleashed the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, he has a farreaching military-political strategy. His number one priority, of course, is to reduce, if not eliminate, the bombings that have turned daily life in Israel into a nightmare. But beyond that he hopes

? To crush or emasculate the Palestinian Authority so that it can no longer exercise effective independent political action.

? To sweep aside the last remnants of the peace process inaugurated by the Israeli- Palestinian Oslo agreement of 1993.

? To restore Israeli security control over the whole of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

? To negotiate a "long-term interim agreement" with compliant Palestinians that will provide for some form of Palestinian autonomy, perhaps including nominal statehood, on a restricted area of the West Bank and Gaza.

? To continue, in the meantime, expansion of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.

? To stimulate, if not a largescale exodus, at least " creeping transfer" of Palestinian Arabs from Palestine.

? To reinforce the Israeli hold over east Jerusalem.

This is a gigantic effort to switch the clock back to the period between 1967 and 1987 when Israel's occupation was relatively unchallenged.

In 1982 Sharon's projected "new order" in Lebanon collapsed in disaster and ignominy for Israel - and for Sharon personally. What are his prospects now?

Most security experts doubt terrorism can be eradicated by purely military means. But terrorism does not require much of an "infrastructure": in the hands of a fanatic a car can be a highly effective explosive device.

The humiliation of Arafat and the decapitation of the Palestinian Authority may assuage Israeli public opinion. The Israelis will still be left with the problem of findingfellow-signatories for the proposed "long-term interim agreement". The lynchings this week of suspected collaborators suggest that it will be hard to find Palestinians willing to stick their necks out.

The Oslo agreements may appear dead ducks. But they remain valid international treaties to which Israel, which regards itself as a country of laws, is legally bound. It is most improbable that their unilateral repudiation could secure international legitimacy.

Political and security control over the occupied territories cannot easily be separated - as recent events have demonstrated. If Israel wants to police the West Bank it will also have to administer it. If Israelis do that, they will present inviting targets for terrorism. Palestinian quislings will not rush to volunteer.

Expansion of the settlements carries additional risks: recent events have shown that isolated settlements are highly vulnerable to terrorist attack.

In the past, many nonideological Israelis bought cheap, subsidised apartments in the West Bank. Few will buy now.

"Creeping transfer" could not significantly alter the demog raphic balance between Arabs and Jews - unless it developed into largescale ethnic cleansing, which would rapidly provoke international-intervention. As for Jerusalem, it is vain to think that its Arab population, about a third of the whole, can permanently be sliced off from their hinterland.

They include a professional and intellectual elite who have shown over the past 35 years a resilient capacity to maintain their Palestinian identity.

Sharon's grand design, therefore, is a dead end. It is not likely to achieve even its initial goals. Instead, as in Lebanon, Sharon has plunged his country into a morass.

As in 1982, most Israelis have been persuaded that there is no alternative to this war and that their national survival is at stake. The root of the problem, they think, is the unreasoning hatred of Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian people - "a nation of homicidal maniacs" as an Israeli diplomat called them the other day. Whatever the merits of that as an analysis (and it is deficient on many counts), it implies no resolution save two-way mutual genocide.

Can outside intervention change the picture? The Arab states know that they would be clobbered in any conventional war with Israel. Europe may cluck but has no clout. Kofi Annan has made some genuinely eloquent speeches but acknowledges that there is only a limited role for the United Nations at the moment. The US administration remains divided and unready, even at this moment of high crisis, to take decisive action - as the mission of the hapless General Zinni has demonstrated.

Eventually, as in Lebanon, Sharon's overstretched imperial edifice will succumb to the force of gravity. Once again it is likely to leave human and political debris strewn over a wide area. The probable costs, not only to the Palestinians, but to Sharon's own people and the rest of the world are incalculable.

Bernard Wasserstein is the author of Divided Jerusalem (Profile Books, paperback £9.99).