It's my party, says Bush

We British like to think ourselves streetwise. We own passports, travel widely, profess xenophobia but actually quite like abroad. In particular, we know our way around the US. We have done Disney World, learned to take a raincheck, and maybe even worked there. We read American novels and feast on US movies and television. So how does Tony Blair now find himself the latest in the long line of British prime ministers who have misjudged America and our influence on its leadership ? A month ago, Mr Blair was feted in Washington, the most famous British politician there since Margaret Thatcher.

Yet by last Monday, Britain's Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, was warning publicly that US and British views of the struggle against terrorism could be heading apart. He was authorised to say what the Prime Minister cannot. The Bush Administration is driving its own train to war; Washington offers its allies only passenger accommodation. Thus the British Government, nettled and saddened, feels obliged to signal that it will take no through-ticket to America's destination until it knows a lot more about where that might be. Mr Blair is an idealist who unveiled his vision of a better world at the Labour conference to the admiration of many political showmen.

Even then, however, some of us were alarmed by his messianic ideas. We had a nasty feeling he might mean it, might kid himself that Britain could lead the mission.

The first test of his dream has come in Afghanistan. In the Prime Minister's initial euphoria about his relationship with Washington, he expected British troops to join Americans on the ground: they would stabilise Afghan society and secure humanitarian relief. Mr Blair also believed the US shared his conviction that military action against terrorists must be matched by a new determination to bring justice to the Palestinians, by bringing unprecedented pressure on Israel.

President Bush seems to have made friendly noises down the phone to the Prime Minister, who interpreted them as acquiescence. British troops were made ready. But within days, Washington made it plain it would not commit a single US soldier to nation-building in Afghanistan, with or without the Brits. The British are not only out of the decision-making loop on American military operations, British commanders are barely being kept informed on the intelligence loop about what the Americans themselves are doing.

Meanwhile in the Middle East, amid a new wave of suicide bombings in Israel, America's willingness to pressure the Sharon regime has visibly seeped away. In the long term, America's unwillingness to act tough on Israel is likely to prove a fatal blow to the campaign against international terrorism. Mr Blair is dead right on this. But Washington isn't listening.

On Afghanistan, Mr Blair remains so determined to do the moral thing that several thousand British troops are even now being prepared for peacekeeping duties. Yet many people, including those in uniform who will have to do the job, ask why Britain should voluntarily take this lead. It may be noble to become policemen to the most violent society on earth, but heaven knows what it has to do with the struggle against international terrorism. A cynic might say that the Americans have told the British that, beyond a few SAS, they are unwanted as war partners but will be allowed to clean up the mess afterwards.

In Afghanistan itself, an almost complete absence of reliable information makes it impossible to know how close the Americans are to getting Osama bin Laden, which I still believe is the vital objective, defining success or failure. US intelligence experts express fears that many Taliban and al Qaeda fighters are getting away, but today Washington says it believes Bin Laden is pinpointed in the White Mountains. We should all be hoping so. If the al Qaeda leader is killed or captured, the US policy will be triumphantly vindicated. If not, then not.

Meanwhile, the US is preparing for new operations in Somalia and Iraq with even less allied consultation. We assume that fears about extensions of the war caused Mr Blair to let Sir Michael Boyce deliver his warning. Many who share America's determination to fight international terrorism want to see the next stages conducted by low-key intelligence and special forces operations, without recourse to B-52s. Yet there is no sign that the American people in their present mood are willing to take advice from any ally, however supportive. They will do it their own way, and they don't much mind if we don't like that way.

All this is sobering for friends of the US. Yet we should not be surprised; it has always been so. However polite Americans may be to such cheer-leaders as Mr Blair, their influence on US decisionmaking is close to nil. The historic lesson is that, however difficult it may be, we have somehow got to make European defence work. A real bilateral partnership with America is not on offer. That fine US Ambassador in London, Raymond Seitz, remarked more than a decade ago that America is interested in Britain only insofar as it is a player in Europe. He was right then, and he is righter now. Europe can never rival American military power, but at least we might one day make ourselves more than a bit-part player.

Mr Blair is only the latest visitor to the White House to discover that US presidents give British prime ministers good lunches, but brook no argument about the guest list, the menu, or the entertainment. America's wars are American parties. The rest of us are only privileged guests, left to hope fervently that the hosts know what they are doing. Victory in Afghanistan, if it comes, will be an American victory, on which our own influence is negligible.