Dramatic No10 pleas to spies

Downing Street issued a desperate appeal to spy chiefs for more evidence against Saddam Hussein days before publishing Tony Blair's dossier on weapons in Iraq.

The disclosure today backed the account of weapons expert David Kelly that there was immense pressure from No 10 to bolster the case for war.

Details of the last-minute plea were revealed at the Hutton Inquiry during a detailed grilling of intelligence chief John Scarlett, the official author of the report.

It was contained in an urgent email sent on 11 September, 13 days before the dossier was published. The language of the email made clear there was great agitation from Downing Street over the lack of hard evidence against Iraq.

It said that No10, through the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee Mr Scarlett, "wants the document to be as strong as possible within the bounds of available intelligence". The email continued: "This is therefore a last (!) call for any items of intelligence that agencies think can and should be included. Responses needed by 12:00 tomorrow."

The email was circulated to spy chiefs by a middle-ranking official working for Mr Scarlett. Asked whether it had been right to exert such pressure, Mr Scarlett said: "I saw and see nothing wrong in that at all." The inquiry heard that the intelligence agencies were urged to identify "personalities" linked to specific weapons programmes in Iraq.

They were also asked for evidence that Iraq sought to employ foreign experts to help its arms build-up.

Counsel for the inquiry, James Dingemans, QC, suggested that the memo revealed a frantic trawl for harder evidence as the dossier deadline loomed.

He said: "It gives the impression that there is a bit of a, sort of, looking into cupboards to see if there is anything that has been overlooked that might be put in the dossier."

Sir David Omand, the Government's security and intelligence coordinator, defended the memo and said: "You must bear in mind that the MoD was determined to produce as strong a document as possible, consistent with intelligence sources." It was not the first time concerns were expressed at the lack of evidence, the inquiry heard. In March the dossier project was shelved for three months because Downing Street did not think the early drafts contained enough hard facts.

Mr Scarlett said he had been told by Sir David that this was the reason for its being shelved from March until June.

Mr Scarlett denied being put under pressure to "sex up" the dossier but he admitted there was unease among some intelligence officers about the crucial claim that Saddam had chemical and biological weapons ready to use at 45 minutes' notice.

He said that on 17 September a meeting changed the wording of the dossier's summary to make clear that the Government was not completely sure of the information. "They had no objection to this item being included in the text of the dossier but they queried whether it was right to include it as a judgment," Mr Scarlett told Lord Hutton.

"They queried if it should be qualified in the executive summary with the words 'Intelligence suggest that'."

The change, which was meant to be Whitehall code to imply the claim was not watertight, was agreed - but few members of the public would have realised its significance.

The inquiry was shown previously unseen top secret memos which bolstered the Government's repeated denials that the 45-minute claim was added to embellish the case against Saddam.

Mr Scarlett said intelligence was obtained on 30 August from a senior Iraqi military officer and added to the draft dossier on 5 September.

The inquiry was shown a memo from the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) which said the 45-minute figure was the maximum time for Saddam to launch chemical or biological weapons - but the average time was just 20 minutes.

Mr Scarlett denied claims that Mr Blair or his media chief Alastair Campbell had anything to do with inserting the critical 45-minute allegation in the dossier.

And the inquiry into the death of Dr Kelly was shown a top-secret memo written by intelligence officials that backed up Downing Street's repeated insistence that the claim was believed by MI6.

Although the names of the author and recipient were blacked out, it was described as coming from the DIS and dated 6 September 2002 - less than three weeks before the dossier was published.

The document appeared to show that Saddam was thought capable of deploying devastating chemical or biological weapons in half the time actually reported in the dossier. In this hardening of the original assessment, the memo stated: "The intelligence refers to a maximum time of 45 minutes, the average time was 20 minutes. This could have important implications in the event of a conflict."

The implication, and especially the reference to "conflict", is that MI6 was convinced Saddam not only posed a theoretical threat but actually might use weapons of mass destruction.

The disclosure that Iraq had weapons at much shorter standby times will greatly strengthen Mr Blair's defence against the BBC's reporter Andrew Gilligan. It was Gilligan's report that the dossier was deliberately "sexed up" by No10 to exaggerate the threat posed by Saddam. Dr Kelly apparently committed suicide after being named as Gilligan's source.

Mr Scarlett said Gilligan's report was "completely untrue... I knew instantly that it was completely untrue and nobody was in a better position than I was to know that."

But Mr Scarlett refused a demand from No10 to write a public letter denouncing Gilligan's report.

He told the Hutton Inquiry that he was asked directly by Mr Campbell to write a letter about the allegations on Radio4's Today programme to put the record straight. He said: "But I said I would not do that. I didn't think it would be appropriate and certainly not normal for any chairman of the joint intelligence committee to make that sort of statement in public." Mr Scarlett confirmed the BBC was right when it said the information came from a single source which was not corroborated.

But Mr Scarlett said the agent was a senior Iraqi military officer in a position to know. Mr Scarlett said: "It was an established and reliable line of reporting."

He said that a 16 September draft of the dossier made four references to the claims including the words that some of the weapons "could be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them" and others that they "may be able" to be deployed.

Mr Scarlett said his staff had "no memory of changing the wording or recollections of a particular reason for changing the wording".

Mr Scarlett also denied he had been aware of any anxiety among intelligence officers about No 10's involvement in preparing the dossier.

Mr Scarlett stressed that he had had a personal discussion with Campbell to ensure that he would have the final say on the dossier.

"It was very important that only one person and one unit had ownership of this exercise and that was to be me and I wanted it stated clearly in writing," he said.

"I made sure it was me. I was completely in control of the process. I felt that at the time and I feel it subsequently." However, he accepted that it had been helpful to have " presentational advice" on preparing the dossier from No10.

Mr Dingemans asked him: "Were there any serious rows or disagreements between you and Mr Campbell?" Mr Scarlett: "No".

Mr Dingemans: "Or between others on the Joint Intelligence Committee and Mr Campbell?"

Mr Scarlett: "No".