America can't beat terrorism on its own

In a lecture I gave three months ago, I expressed doubts about the efficacy of bombing as an instrument in "the war against terrorism". In fact selective bombing in support of ground attacks by the Northern Alliance and its allies, linked together by an intelligence and communications network masterminded from a command centre in the United States, proved an essential element in a brilliant campaign that perhaps marks a turning point in the history of war, and for which the United States armed forces deserve high praise. There was, alas, "collateral damage". Innocent Afghan civilians were certainly killed, but far fewer than in previous comparable campaigns. But in winning the campaign in Afghanistan, bombing "worked", and without it the war would probably still be dragging on with far greater losses on both sides. Like many others better informed than myself, I got it wrong, and I apologise.

A war against "terrorism" as such can no more be won than can a war against disease. But with patience and skill, particular diseases can be controlled and even eliminated, and so can particular terrorist organisations.

There are two approaches for dealing with it. One is the liberal ideal: a police action conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, with any necessary military operations being conducted by an alliance acting strictly in accordance with the Geneva Conventions to apprehend suspects and bring them to trial before an international court where they would be treated according to strict process of law. The other is rather more popular in the US today. For many, perhaps most Americans, this is simply "America's War", and is so described on radio news programmes: a private fight conducted by the armed forces of the US against almost cosmic forces of evil.

In this war, Afghanistan was only the first round. No holds are barred, and America must do "whatever it takes". The support of the outside world is welcome, and indeed expected, but the war itself will be waged and won by Americans.

The first of these paradigms - the liberal ideal - may be desirable, but it is quite unrealistic. In their present mood the American people are simply not prepared to subject themselves to any international authority or hand over the perpetrators of the Twin Towers massacre to any foreign jurisdiction. Throughout the US today there is still a visceral demand for vengeance that may be deplored but has to be accepted. In any case the record shows that "the international community", as such, is quite unable to get its act together for any serious military intervention unless the US not only supports it but plays a leading role.

But if this liberal paradigm is desirable but unrealistic, the other, "America's War", though realistic, is highly undesirable. In the first place this is not simply "America's War". Leaving aside for a moment the question whether it is a war at all, it is a matter that concerns the entire civilised world. Al Qaeda may have struck at a target in New York, and New York is unquestionably on the territory of the United States, but it is an international city; and its status as such is symbolised by the presence of the United Nations.

Further, for whatever reason, the US has many enemies in the world, some for good reason, some for ludicrously trivial. By appropriating this conflict to itself, the United States unnecessarily alienates many potential supporters from what should be a truly global alliance. By nationalising rather than internationalising the conflict, the US has weakened its own capacity to wage it.

Worse, the American administration is in danger of spoiling a historic opportunity of a kind that occurs at best once in a generation, of using its power to mould a better world. This is an opportunity of which our Prime Minister is obviously aware, and which perhaps accounts for the enthusiasm with which he has supported the American war effort. In 1945 the US was able to convert a wartime alliance into a framework for world governance capable of embracing her wartime enemies. In 1990 her rapid liquidation of the Cold War and generosity to her former adversaries held out genuine promise of "A New World Order", if only the world were capable of being so ordered. The events of last autumn seemed to provide just such another catalytic moment. Out of the evil done on 11 September it looked as if unprecedented good might come. It still might, and it still should.

But it will only come about if the US abandons its unilateral approach to the handling of terrorism and recognises that it can only effectively be dealt with by the international community that it has itself done so much to create, but which still needs American leadership if it is to function effectively. The eradication of al Qaeda and its associates will be the task of co-operative action by national police and intelligence services; a task comparable to, and closely linked with, the eradication of the drug traffic: dirty, unglamorous, unheroic, and mainly conducted in the shadows.

If a further "war" against a sovereign state does become necessary to root out the terrorist network, let us be clear that it is a war. It is one undertaken after all peaceful alternatives have been clearly exhausted, with full understanding of its regional and international repercussions and consequences, waged with the support, if not the participation, of the bulk of the international community, sanctioned by the UN, and conducted so far as possible in accordance with civilised conventions and with the least possible collateral damage, and in full realisation of the mess that will have to be cleared up afterwards.

Even then we must not be surprised if it gets a bad press throughout the Islamic world.

Our object in combating terrorists must be not to exact revenge but to bring them to justice. They are criminals, and must be seen as such and treated as such; not accorded the heroic status to which they aspire. Like all such previous campaigns, this is a battle for hearts and minds; and the hearts and minds that matter are those in the Islamic world.

? This is an edited extract of a speech to be delivered at ` University College, London, by Professor Sir Michael Howard former Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford University.