45-minute WMD claim 'too thin'

Intelligence behind the Government's key "45-minute" claim on Iraq's weapons arsenal was so "thin" that it was impossible to say whether it related to battlefield or long-range weapons, Lord Butler's inquiry into the affair has been told.

The rebel Iraqi general who passed on the now infamous claim to MI6 did not know any details beyond the time frame and his allegation should have subjected to much greater rigour, the investigation is set to conclude.

Although MI6's original "CX" intellligence report of the claim was potentially valuable, it was so vague that it should have been carefully caveated when inserted into Downing Street's dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, sources have revealed.

The claim that Saddam Hussein could launch an attack using chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so was deemed so important to Tony Blair that it was mentioned four times in the dossier.

The Prime Minister highlighted it in his own foreword, in the executive summary and twice in the body of the dossier published in September 2002 in the run-up to war. The claim triggered headlines around the world.

But key experts in the Ministry of Defence's Defence Intelligence Staff had warned that the intelligence for the 45-minute claim had no details of the type of munitions it referred to. Lord Butler's inquiry into the intelligenceused to support the war is due to be released next Wednesday and was sent to the printers yesterday.

During Lord Hutton's inquiry last year, MI6 chief Sir Richard Dearlove described the intelligence as "as piece of well-sourced intelligence". He said it came "from an established and reliable source who was certainlyin a position to know this information".

Senior DIS analysts, including Dr Brian Jones, had warned against a strong wording on the claim. But it went into the dossier as meaning: "The Iraqi military are able to deploy these weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so." The head of DIS, Air Marshal Joe French, and his deputy Tony Cragg, dismissed Dr Jones's fears and agreed that the Joint Intelligence Committee could use it in the dossier.

Sir Richard agreed that it could be used in its strongest formulation.