Jonathan Shaw: We can only beat Islamic State with Muslim support

The IS revolt against the House of Saud (who it seeks to supplant as the guardians of Mecca and Medina) is unusual in two respects. First, it has emerged outside of Saudi Arabia. Secondly, it deliberately uses language lifted straight from the teaching of Abd Al-Wahhab. This gives it serious theocratic credibility within Saudi: a recent poll quoted from the Al-Hayat Saudi newspaper had 92 per cent of respondents agreeing that “IS conform to values of Islam and Islamic law”. It is no surprise, then, that funding for IS has come from within Saudi Arabia.

So how should the West respond? And what are the historical precedents? The 1979 revolt was handled internally, the 1929 revolt with the aid of Western technology. The initial Al Saud/Abd al-Wahhabi movement was crushed in 1818 by an Ottoman-funded Egyptian force, but not before it had massacred over 5,000 Shia in Karbala (now in Iraq). Key to all these responses was that they were Muslim-led. This is fundamentally a battle for the soul of Islam: the Wahhabi idea is not going to be killed by Western, Christian bullets.

So the start point for the Western response is that it must be in support of a Muslim plan. Critically, US air power used so far to counter IS advances has been asked for by the Muslim (Shia) government of Iraq. If Obama so far lacks a strategy it is probably (at least in part) because he is waiting for the Muslim world to recognise the threat to itself and create a strategy for coping with it — one that the West can and should whole heartedly support.

Deploying the Western military without a Muslim political plan would be folly, as illustrated by both our Iraq and Afghan campaigns. Indeed, this seems to be a lesson our political masters have learnt, as shown by the House of Commons’ rejection a year ago of Cameron’s proposals for Syrian intervention.

Responding to the IS revolt is complicated by its use of social media. The unimpeachable theological credentials of IS makes dealing with them tricky: the response will need to be finely judged. This ideology cannot be compromised with: true to their Abd al-Wahhab roots, the choice they offer their conquered populations is conversion or death.

The normal Western diplomatic deal-making mechanisms will not work. Islamic State needs to be seen by the rest of the Islamic ummah as a threat to the tribe and, in accordance with Arab tribal custom, destroyed. Only the Muslim world can do this, by use of theology and hard power. Keeping the support of the ummah through what looks like being a protracted campaign will be key.

Western intervention without this Muslim cover takes two risks: that of making IS’s propaganda point about Western interference in Islam, and making the West the primary object of IS’s attention — which it isn’t at present, notwithstanding the current frenzy over Western hostages. For IS differs from al Qaeda in its focus: while al Qaeda aims outwards at the corrupting West, IS aims inwards at those Muslims who it believes have strayed from the pure path (Sufis, Shias, all non-Wahhabis).

The global economy depends on Middle East oil. How IS and Wahhabism are confronted is critical. But the urge for “something to be done” should be resisted. Obama’s inaction may cause less harm than action. That at least buys time for a response from those most directly threatened — the non-Wahhabi Muslim majority of the Middle East.

Major-General Jonathan Shaw is a former director of Special Forces and the ex-head of counter-terrorism at the Ministry of Defence