Perhaps the time has also come to think about having a fixed-term CEO Act, in much the same way that we now have a Fixed-term Parliament Act.
The chiefs would lay out their manifesto for the business and have a set period of time — let’s say four or five years — to execute.
This would not interfere with the normal channels of shareholder democracy in the case of failing CEOs. If, on the other hand, shareholders wished to re-elect the boss on a fresh mandate, that would also be their right, but two terms in office would be the limit.
This system might help prevent burn-out among those who cannot see the finishing line. And it would act as a bulwark against the cult of personality which has too often seen domineering leaders stay on far too long at the expense of their companies, employees, customers and shareholders alike.
Some might argue that short fixed-terms of employment would make it harder to align pay to the longer-term interests of shareholders.
But long-term incentive plans and other performance-related pay mechanisms are falling into disrepute because of the ease with which they can be gamed and the way that they make pay an output not of how well a business is run but the way the market reacts.
Who knows, maybe CEOs would even relish knowing that they can step off a treadmill at a predestined time?
At least it would still give them a bit more longevity than a football manager, whose average expectancy in the job is 14 months.