We fought the Opium Wars to force the Chinese to open their market to early British drug dealers — and took Hong Kong off them at the same time — a humiliation Beijing has not forgotten even if we have.
Thus, there was certainly a time by the Victorian era when Britain did indeed dominate the world’s trade, shipping and sea routes.
But interestingly, even then, the Tory party was divided. It split over the repeal of the Corn Laws into a protectionist and an open trading wing and, as a result, was out of office for a generation — May’s not-so-secret nightmare.
And then Germany and other nations industrialised and began to catch up — a rivalry which played its part in igniting the First World War. Britain’s trading dominance did not last long.
Rolling forward to more recent times without the benefit of the captive markets of empire, the British trading performance has been nothing to get excited about.
It is heavily dependent on a few key areas — armaments, aerospace, whisky, pharmaceuticals and North Sea oil. We have some world-class companies — but not enough of them.
Nor is that likely to change quickly. Management consultants McKinsey analysed British manufacturing a few years ago and found that only a small part was internationally competitive or had something uniquely British which made people abroad want to buy.
Even if these world-class businesses doubled and redoubled their global penetration, their success would be dwarfed by the likely job losses in those areas of manufacturing vulnerable to cheap imports.
It is not a debate which will be resolved any time soon but we should also consider a point made recently by Robert Wade a professor at the London School of Economics in a letter to the Financial Times: gains from trade are often exaggerated and there are other routes to growth which are potentially less toxic when it comes to inequality, unemployment and regional economic deprivation.
Citing theories originally espoused by Charles Babbage, Victorian inventor of what is reckoned to be the first computer, he suggests the vitality of an economy depends on its capability triad — its mix of production capabilities, business organisation and economic governance.
Trade effectively leaves success or failure to be determined by the market. The capability triad suggests the opposite. It implies that success can also go to governments and countries which pursue consistent, long-term industrial and commercial policies slanted to favour the domestic economy.
In this case, research and development are actively encouraged and innovation is geared to continuous improvement, while management and workplace skills are actively fostered.
This is the opposite of the way the UK has been run since the Seventies. But it has worked for Singapore and, if and when we do leave the EU, it is more than ever what is likely to be needed here given that our low-wage economy is no longer fit for purpose.
That will pose an interesting philosophical challenge for a conservative government.
